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Biographia Literaria and the Language of Science
Abstract

When Coleridge began dictating his Biographia Literaria in 1815, he was at the same time becoming actively
involved in a medico-philosophical controversy that was then drawing the attention of many medical men and
philosophers in England. The fundamental issue behind the quarrel, a materialistic versus a vitalist theory of
nature, was one Coleridge had argued in one form or another throughout his career.1 Yet, the challenge of
modern science specifically had never been so strong nor had it so vociferously demanded his attention as it
did in the years from 1814 to 1819. Coleridge's response is well documented: the revised and enlarged version
of The Friend, his Lay Sermons, the "Theory of Life," and a series of philosophical letters written between
November 1816 and January 1818 all testify to Coleridge's growing concern with the challenge of science to
his philosophy and to his need to validate his philosophical beliefs with scientific evidence.
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BIOGRAPHIA LITERARIA AND THE LANGUAGE OF SCIENCE

BY TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN

As far as words go, I have become a formidable chemist.
Coleridge, Letter to Humphry Davy, 1801

When Coleridge began dictating his Biographia Literaria in 1815, h

was at the same time becoming actively involved in a medico-philosophical controversy that was then drawing the attention of many medical m
and philosophers in England. The fundamental issue behind the quarre
a materialistic versus a vitalist theory of nature, was one Coleridge h
argued in one form or another throughout his career.1 Yet, the challeng
of modern science specifically had never been so strong nor had it so vo-

ciferously demanded his attention as it did in the years from 1814 t
1819. Coleridge's response is well documented: the revised and enlarg

version of The Friend, his Lay Sermons, the "Theory of Life," and a seri

of philosophical letters written between November 1816 and January

1818 all testify to Coleridge's growing concern with the challenge of sci
ence to his philosophy and to his need to validate his philosophical belief

with scientific evidence. In one of his letters to C. A. Tulk, Coleridg
prefaces a long account of the forces of nature with these remarks: "
my literary Life you will find a sketch of the subjective Pole of the Dynamic Philosophy. ... In the third volume of the Friend, now in th
Press, you will find the great results of this Philosophy in its relation t
Ethics and Theology-while the enclosed Scrawl contains a very, ver
rude and fragmentary delineation of the Objective Pole, or the Science o
the Construction of Nature." la The enclosed scrawl is in fact an abstract

of Coleridge's "Theory of Life," his most detailed and comprehensive
scientific treatise and a work which refers explicitly to John Abernethy

and other major figures in the then current medical controversy. The
literary life is of course the Biographia Literaria, roughly contemporaneous with the posthumously published "Theory of Life" and likewise in
the orbit of the scientific debates. That the Biographia Literaria also refers
to scientists involved in the medical debate is only tangentially significant;

that the Biographia Literaria employs much of the scientific language used
in the "Theory of Life" and implicitly derives many of its critical models
See, e.g., Walter Jackson Bates' Samuel Taylor Coleridge (New York, 1968).
la Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. E. L. Griggs (London,
1956-59), IV, 767.
399
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from the scientific models sketched in that work
significant, for it shows Coleridge transferring
which suffused his intellectual life at the time to a

criticism. Probably no other alteration in the lang
has affected the practice of criticism more.

Coleridge's prolific response to the medical con
the composition of the Biographia Literaria was
of many years of reading and thinking about scie
at Christ's Hospital, Coleridge flirted on and off
try; and his meeting in 1799 with Humphry D
the beginning of a friendship that inspired Coler

for his poetry and solutions to his own metaphysi

research. In one of the rare articles on Colerid

Coburn relates how, at its outset, this friendship b

new chemistry and the father of the new criticis
tive: Coleridge shared much of Davy's scientific r

searched for the laws within the impalpable, w

searching out laws of substances hitherto unknow
neath the static appearance of the stone, or the p
the flame, the loud bang, the explosive energy. Th

by the revelation of unsuspected relationships

things, inanimate as well as animate." It is not su
ridge's and Davy's descriptions of the poet and th
are strikingly similar, or that "Coleridge's descrip

eraria of the imagination derives at least some
from the fact that although he is talking about t
might in places equally be talking about Davy's ch

2 Kathleen Coburn, "Coleridge, a Bridge Between Sci
tions on the Bicentenary of his Birth," in Coleridge's V
don, 1974), 91, 95. My entire essay is indebted to some
article, and I am more generally indebted to M. H. Abr
in Sound': Science, Metascience, and Imagination," Proc

Philosophical Society, 116 (1972), 458-75. In addition

has informed me of one of Coleridge's richer scientific

his Notebooks (ed. Kathleen Coburn), no. 3116 (f. 1
"Red, Green, and Violet the only colors," and tries
mixtures of two colors accordingly. His Idea come

Young's new theory - now called the Young-Helmholtz
searched the Philosophical Transactions for the period

she missed Young's article: "Production of Colours"

system of the primary colors. It was published in the
The theory is presented again in Young's Lectures on N
XXXVII (1807). Others, like David Brewster, continued
red, yellow, and blue were the primaries because paint

by these and the mixture of two or all three. It's p

Young's text because it's not in the first article he pub

in a correction in a later page in the same volume.
Schapiro for the above information.
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It is important to realize, however, that these affinities between Coleridge and Davy are based on Davy's work around 1802, ten years before

the waning of their intellectual friendship. Coleridge avidly followed
Davy's 1802 lectures and read his work for many years after; but the
famous marginal note to Boehme's Aurora (1612) summarizes the vicissitudes of a relationship strained by the demands of modern science:

O how gladly would I resign my life . . . to procure for mankind such health
and longevity to H. Davy, as should enable him to discover the Element of
metals, of Sulphur and of Carbon. O! he will do it! Yea and may perhaps revea
the synthetic Idea of the Antithets, Attraction and Repulsion.
S. T. C.

Alas! since I wrote the preceding note H. Davy is become Sir Humph

and an Atomist!3

As M. H. Abrams illustrates in The Mirror and the Lamp, using writers
like Keats as examples, the personal misunderstandings between Davy
and Coleridge were in part a product of general rift in England between
science and poetry in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, Coleridge

belonging to the poetic school of spirit and imagination and Davy often
tending toward a progressive science which was becoming increasingly
mechanistic and materialistic. Davy, in fact, never totally accepted the
theories of atomists like Dalton, and he and Coleridge would always remain distant admirers. Yet the gap that atomistic science was creating
between poetry and science made it increasingly difficult for them to share

and discuss philosophies. Unhappily for the poets, the disparity between
the two disciplines could only diminish poetry's value, as scientists claimed
that the poetic vision was a fantastic way of knowing with little relevance
to the scientific laws of nature. For Coleridge, this claim-that there was

an inherent and inescapable conflict between science and poetry-was
intolerable, for if the scientific validity of imaginative perception could
not be maintained, the moral principles founded on that imaginative per-

ception would be in danger of dissipating as ethereal musings. Thus in
the Treatise on Method (1818) he bemoans a world suffering "from a
subversion of the natural and necessary order of science: from elevating
the terrestrial, as it were called, above the celestial; and from summoning

Reason and Faith to the bar of that limited Physical experience."4 The
visions of science and poetry must remain parallel and complementary
ways of seeing, both supporting a dynamic and spiritual conception of
life; and the rise of a mechanistic science in 1812 became, consequently,
a betrayal representative of a trend that had to be countered in every way

possible.
Cited in Alice D. Snyder, Coleridge on Logic and Learning (New Haven,
1929), 23.

4S. T. Coleridge's Treatise on Method, ed. Alice D. Snyder (London, 1934), 8.
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Hard on the heels of the disagreements betw

the medical controversy of 1814-1819 erupt

sembling those that separated the two men. T

catalyzed the debate whose principal spokes

(1764-1831) and Sir William Lawrence (1783-1867): Abernethy
championed Hunter's spiritual and dynamic principles of life, and Lawrence charged that Abernethy's misinterpretations of Hunter were ridicu-

lously unscientific, that Abernethy and his followers arbitrarily-and
sometimes fantastically-used strictly scientific phenomena like magnetism or electricity to account for life itself. Abernethy's vital principle,

according to Lawrence, was "like a camel, or like a whale, or like what
you please."5 Documenting the main points of this argument in Coleridge on Logic and Learning, Alice Snyder notes that the "fundamental
questions of the controversy seem to have been two: first, the relation
of structure to function; second, the place of theory in physiological investigation-broadly speaking, the method of scientific thought and procedure." 6

The battle lines on the two questions were clearly drawn. Operating
from an avowed theological foundation, Abernethy "could accept no
physical science that did violence to his conception of spirit."7 The life
force, he maintained, was independent of organization and structure and
prior to it, for the priority of function to structure was essential to the
concept of functional unity in any organism. Lawrence, on the other
hand, kept his biology and his theology segregated. For him, that an organism was the product of organization was an irrefragable scientific fact,

independent of religious questions. Regarding the second question, it is
almost needless to point out that Lawrence, the laboratory worker, strong-

ly objected to theories and hypotheses and minimized the role of speculation in scientific labor as much as possible. But Abernethy made the
most of theory and hypotheses, and "justified them on grounds that sug-

gest the instrumentalist's point of view; he justified them, that is, on
grounds of the concrete investigation that they provoked and con-

trolled." 7a

If these were the questions Hunter's work raised and the solutions
each faction loudly proclaimed, it goes without saying that both Abernethy and Lawrence discovered in Hunter what they wanted to discover,
a way of responding that Coleridge was equally guilty of when he entered
the ring of the debate. After rehearsing the quarrel, in his "Theory of

Life," Coleridge hails Abernethy's role in developing "the true idea of
life," a dynamic philosophy like Coleridge's own which gave priority to
5 Sir William Lawrence, Introduction to Comparative Anatomy (1816), 169.
6 Snyder, 18.
7 Snyder, 21.
7aIbid.
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function over structure and emphasized the laws of nature rather than
the arrangement of particles. "In Mr. Abernethy's Lecture on the Theory
of Life," Coleridge writes, "it is impossible not to see a presentiment of
a great truth. ... If the opinions here supported are the same with those
of Mr. Abernethy I rejoice in his authority. If they are different, I shall
wait with anxious interest for an exposition of that difference."8 Thoroughly idiosyncratic, "Theory of Life" is Coleridge's defense of Hunter's
and Abernethy's vitalism; it attempts to prove and to illustrate that "Life
itself is not a thing-a self-subsistent hypostasis-but an act and a process" (TL, 430). The arrangement of separate bodies or atoms does not
explain life; rather, "The most comprehensive formula to which life is
reducible, would be that of the internal copula of bodies, or ... the power
which discloses itself from within as a principle of unity in the many"
(TL, 384). To prove these claims Coleridge presents a detailed outline
of the evolution of life as it manifests itself through the conjunction of
three forces, magnetism, electricity, and what Coleridge labeled "chemical affinity." Not surprisingly, each of these forces plays an important
role in Biographia Literaria.
In its intent and language, "Theory of Life" is clearly a scientific tract,
directed at a scientific audience and employing the scientific discourse that

Coleridge knew from his attendance at Royal Society lectures and his
indefatigable reading of such scientific journals as William Nicholson's
Journal of Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, and the Arts and the Royal
Society's Philosophical Transactions. There is some difficulty, though, in
isolating a "scientific discourse" in 1815, since a specialized language for

science is only just emerging at this time, just as a specialized thinker
called a scientist is only just beginning to be recognized.9 Coleridge obviously belongs to an earlier tradition where the scientist is first of all a
natural philosopher, perhaps best described by the passage from the Republic which Coleridge translates as his epigraph to an essay in The
Friend (1818); Plato distinguishes here between mere "Philotheorists,"
and "those whom alone you may rightly denominate Philosophers, as
knowing what the science of all three branches of science is, which may
prove something more than the mere aggregate of the knowledge of any
particular science.""0 Nineteenth-century scientists, however, could not
be comfortable with this archaic conception of their role. They needed
the precision provided by specialization in thought and language. So while
Coleridge disparages Davy "who seems more and more determined to
mould himself upon the Age, in order to make the Age mould itself upon
8"Hints Towards a More Comprehensive Theory of Life," Miscellanies,
Aesthetic and Literary, ed. T. Ashe (London, 1911), 405-06, (Hereafter, TL).

9See David M. Knight, "The Scientist as Sage," Studies in Romanticism, 6
(1967), 65-88.

10 The Friend, ed. Barbara E. Rooke (London, 1969), I, 472.
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him,"" Davy sees Coleridge's tragedy as a f
gencies of modern science. Coleridge's phil
lacks the "order, precision, and regularity" to
contemporary science.12

Purporting to be more precise and better

colleagues were isolating themselves in their la
their own specialized vocabulary. Hence, wheth
ation or not, if he wished to argue his philoso

to learn to use their language. This does not

discourses, particularly of theology, cannot be
cabulary of 1815. But, after 1800, even in Cole
discourse surfaces with enough autonomy to
of Life" is the clearest evidence of Coleridge
to defend his beleaguered vitalism.
Indeed, translating his own views of scien

idiom becomes a major project for Coleridg
portant is the extent to which this scientific

nomena, such as art, and how far these other
his scientific findings, since implicit in Cole

the common foundation of all areas of kno

never doubts, of course, that there are such p
science and other disciplines. Writing to Tulk

Philosophy . . . takes its roots in Science in
gion,"13 and in a letter to Lord Liverpool t
hope that his own idealistic metaphysics wil
"the late successful researches of the Chemists" which have demonstrated

that "in all pure phaenomena we behold only the copula, the balance or
indifference of opposite energies." Moreover, in the same letter after discussing speculative science, physiology, and "Demiurgic atoms," Coleridge
asks "What is all this to the world at large?" His answer goes some way
in explaining why he does not confine scientific language to a scientific
treatise, but transfers it to other fields, notably the field of literature in

Biographia Literaria. Throughout history, he argues, science or natural
philosophy has maintained so direct a structural correspondence with
other cultural phenomena that this correspondence "must remain inexplicable, unless we admit not only a reaction and interdependence on
both sides, but a powerful, the most indirect influence" of science on the
other fields of knowledge. Using examples of art from the medieval period
and the eighteenth century, he comments, in a way that might anticipate
the twentieth-century philosopher Michel Foucault, "these are all but the
ribs, abutments and sea-marks of a long line of correspondencies in the
11 Collected Letters, II, 1042.

12 S. H. Davy, Fragmentary Remains, ed. John Davy (1858), 74.
13 Collected Letters, IV, 76.
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arts of Taste to the opposite coast of speculative Philosophy." In short

systems of thought and signification affect the structure of contemporaneous systems, so that an error in a system like speculative philosophy or
science could be disseminated throughout other systems. Thus, the "recent
relapse ... of the Chemists to the atomistic scheme, and the almost unani-

mous acceptance of Dalton's Theory in England, & Le Sage's in France

determine the intellectual character of the age with the force of an experimentum crucis;" 14 and even poetry is in danger of being degraded by
a mechanistic science whose laws and models will inevitably affect literary
criticism and poetry. There is a "link or mordaunt by which philosophy

becomes scientific and sciences philosophical,"15 and likewise there is a
link between science and poetry which would allow for the corruption

of poetry by science and the substantiation of both through the truth they

share. "If in the greatest poets we find Nature idealized through the creative power of a profound yet observant meditation, so through the medi

tative observation of a Davy, a Wollaston, a Hatchett, or a Murray, ...
we find poetry, as it were, substantiated and realized." l

In 1815 Coleridge's task, then, was to establish the connections be-

tween his scientific models and the realm of poetry, connections which the

scientific community especially were ignoring or denying. In the perspective of Coleridge's visionary philosophy, these connections were clearly

present; he needed, however, to substantiate and realize them for the

world at large and specifically for his scientific competitors. The solution

was in language; and ease and accuracy in transferring the language o

"Theory of Life"-the scientists' own inbred tongue-to Biographia

Literaria became the most direct and effective way of illustrating th

commensurability, even the authority, of both Coleridge's science and his
poetics.
The way scientific language permeates literary definitions and practical criticism will be my primary concern here; and these areas of Biographia Literaria generally relate to the biological issue of function versus
structural arrangement. But the second topic of these debates, the value

of theory in investigative research, also plays a large role in the Biographia. This second issue is naturally less directly involved with language
itself, and, further, critics of Coleridge are more apt to discuss it, though
rarely in the context of the medical debates which greatly influenced Coleridge's thinking about theory. Snyder notes that during the medical de-

bates, Coleridge
was forced into a fundamental consideration of the processes of thought. There
resulted a vivid realization of the extent to which all thinking is determined by
assumptions, ideas, images, and attitudes of even less tangible sorts. Coleridge's
14 Collected Letters, IV, 758-62.
15 The Friend, I, 463.
1 Treatise on Method, 25.

This content downloaded from 130.91.116.52 on Tue, 19 Sep 2017 17:14:50 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

406 TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN

insistence that fertilized thinking involved more

more than what is commonly meant to empiri
critical part of reasoning, and that they depen
understanding-on a power that brings into p

ciples of thought and method were formulated th

philosophical minds, but to no small extent the
chemical controversies in which he took part.17

More specifically, Coleridge was faced with a
method based on theory and Lawrence's me
based on observation exclusively. He rejecte

his own method based on law, a method de
Kant.17a A scientific definition, Coleridge

should be neither a theory nor a generalizatio
law of the thing, or in such an idea of it, as b
ties and functions are admitted by implicatio

causal, that a full insight having been attaine
it a progressive insight into the necessity and

ena of which it is the law" (TL, 370). In M
Coleridge's Criticism, J. R. de J. Jackson t
vidual preference for "law over theory," h

correct and usually standard.l8 According to
mines the method; the specific ends determin
a scientist like Abernethy apprehends truth,
gence," through material evidence, and must
of theory which is primarily an educated gue
The poet, on the other hand, apprehends inte
the material substance to the essence of phen

and then presenting the law in the language
not depend on the material world for his k

lows Coleridge's thought quite accurately, b
qualifications to add to his discussion: firs

ridge argues, in opposition to speculative scien

based on law, suggesting therefore the same

ence; and secondly, explaining method in

overlooks the reader-critic whose method is d

who is the real subject of Biographia Lite
amount of time and space Coleridge uses t

that he is discussing a way of investigating p
poem, that he is explaining poetry, not accou
may be fine distinctions, they are very impo
distinctions that the medical debates most ob
17 Snyder, 31.

17a Kant defined "nature in general" as "the con

ances in Space and Time" (Critique of Pure Reas

18 Method and Imagination in Coleridge Criticis
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the Biographia: in 1815 the scientific method that Coleridge urges on
both Abernethy and Lawrence is one based on law, and accordingly, the
critical methodology he proposes and uses in Biographia Literaria depends on philosophical law. Both the scientist and the critic work with
more or less refined material data, and for both only Coleridge's procedure based on law can guarantee objectivity and accuracy. In short,
though the critic, the poet, and the scientist all search out law, the critic
reading the poem is more like the scientist investigating a chemical reaction than like a poet writing a poem.
Investigating poetry in 1815, then, Coleridge works according to his
self-defined scientific method in which laws are the lamps of good research, and, as in biological research, these laws "of poetry cannot be
given from without" but "are the very powers of growth and reproduction"'9 which the critic must perceive. Here, as in every science, "it is
the essence of a scientific definition to be causative, . . . by announcing
the law of action in the particular case, in subordination to the common
law of which all phenomena are modifications or results" (TL, 370).
Thus in Biographia Literaria Coleridge's theoretical definitions do not
describe how to make a poem or propose generalized standards or theories
against which to measure a poem; they describe instead the laws of poetry
as formal causes in every poem, and Coleridge's criticisms of Wordsworth,
for instance, point out deviations from these laws. Appropriately, Coleridge's tone and method is that of a biologist noting freakish deviations
in the laws of nature. After presenting the primary laws-polarity, the
secondary imagination, the laws of meter-he examines his material in
their light; concentrating on Wordsworth and Shakespeare he explains
how their works function and where they fall short of the ideal laws of
poetry. Thus the organic metaphor, for Coleridge, does not account for
a poem but explains the ideal laws of its formation; and Coleridge is far
less concerned with the personality behind the poem-William Wordsworth or William Shakespeare-than with the product those two minds
generate.

The issue of theory versus law, however, is only indirectly a product

of the scientific language in Biographia Literaria. The language itself is
a much more immediate and powerful presence, and one of the more
effective ways of emphasizing the ubiquitous presence of the scientific lan-

guage is a simple comparison of passages from the scientific work and
the literary work. These passages are among Coleridge's most frequently

quoted, and one needs only refer to Coleridge's use of centripetal and
centrifugal force, for example, in both "Theory of Life" and Biographia

Literaria to see how directly that language transfers (TL, 391; BL 1,
175). Moreover, there are passages in Biographia Literaria which seem
to refer explicitly to the medical debate, using terms which ostensibly have
9 Biographia Literaria, ed. J. Shawcross (London, 1907), II, 65, (Hereafter,
BL).
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little bearing on literature. This passage from
graphia could have been lifted directly from

context it becomes relevant to Coleridge's
poetics:
The highest perfection of natural philosophy would consist in the perfect spiri-

tualization of all laws of nature into laws of intuition and intellect. The phaenomena (the material) must wholly disappear, and the laws alone (the formal)
must remain. ... The optical phaenomena are but a geometry, the lines of
which are drawn by light, and the materiality of this light itself has already
become a matter of doubt. In the appearance of magnetism all trace of matter
is lost, and of the phaenomena of gravitation . . . there remains nothing but its

law, the execution of which on a vast scale is the mechanism of the heavenly
motions. (BL I, 175)

Further, Coleridge himself suggests what the evolutionary scheme of
"Theory of Life" means to the practicing artist. "Each thing that lives,"
he writes in his essay "On Poesy or Art," has "its moment of self-exposition, and so has each period of each thing"; "each step of nature hath its
ideal, and . . . the possibility of climax up to the perfect form of a harmonized chaos." Therefore, the "artist must imitate that which is within
the thing, that which is active through form and figure, and discourse to

us by symbols-the Natur-geist, ... for so only can he hope to produce
any work truly natural in the object and truly human in the effect" (BL,

259, 262). Contrast this description of imitation to Coleridge's earlier
and vaguer distinction between imitation and copying, and it is obvious
how his scientific scheme of evolution elaborates and extends that original
notion of imitation. The scientific language transforms the earlier simplistic and static definition of imitation as "a combination of a certain degree of dissimilitude with a certain degree of similitude" into a more
dynamic, evolutionary concept that anticipates the pseudo-scientific poetics of Hulme and others.20

A final and more concrete example of Coleridge's transferring the
language of scientific discourse to the definitions and literary principles
in Biographia Literaria is his description of genius, specifically of Words-

worth's genius. Out of context the statement on Wordsworth's development seems an ungainly simile; however, in the context of the medical
debate whose occasion and primary issue was the nature of physiological
disorders and diseases, the language reverberates with a special biological
significance:
it is remarkable how soon genius clears and purifies itself from the faults and
errors of its earliest products; faults which, in its earliest compositions, are the

20 Shakespearan Criticism, ed. T. M. Raysor (London, 1960), II, 53. That the
language here and in Biographia Literaria often comes directly from Schlegel or

Schelling does not weaken my argument since it is the use of the scientific
discourse that matters, not its origin.
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more obtrusive and confluent, because as heterogeneous elements, which h

only a temporary use, they constitute the very ferment, by which they them-

selves are carried off. Or we may compare them to some disease, which mu
work on humours, and be thrown out on the surface, in order to secure t
patient from their future recurrence. (BL I, 57-58)

Here Coleridge's language produces a meaning insofar as it suggests
rather peculiar, biological understanding of how genius develops an

how artistic faults correct themselves. Express this idea in different term

and a different idea takes its place.2'

In each of these examples, I am drawing attention to the scientif

language itself as the formative agent in Coleridge's pronouncements on
literature. Hence, my position is opposite that of most critics who vi
the scientific language as a metaphor in a monistic system that merg
different terminologies. Coleridge's monistic vision is undeniable, but th

scientific discourse is clearly more than metaphoric-or at least meta
phors and similes have a greater role and a more complicated functi

than most critics have observed in the past. If Coleridge's vision is moni
tic, his understanding is pluralistic.2

In a recent article Jonathan Culler makes a similar point about th
connotative power and cultural significance of two of Coleridge's mo

important critical terms, allegory and symbol. Culler begins his analysis
of Coleridge by describing the structural differences which distinguish

allegorical sign from a symbolic sign: "The allegorical sign, we migh

say, is arbitrary: the connection between signifier and signified is impose

by the mind or fancy, while the eye and imagination are aware primari
of the difference. The symbol, on the other hand, is a motivated sign, a
synecdoche, in which the signifier is naturally connected to the signified

This distinction relates, in turn, to the opposition between mechanical a
organic form, the allegory being identified with the mechanical and the
symbol with the organic. We thus have here two fundamental tropes or
codes, or "two ways of organizing the attribution of meaning," the allegorical and the symbolic. And according to Culler, a general doctrinal or
cultural "shift in formal operations for the production of meaning"
counts for Coleridge's preference for the symbolic.23

21 Discussing Coleridge's use of the word "polarity," J. Isaacs makes this sam

point in "Coleridge's Critical Terminology," Essays and Studies (Oxford, 193

XXI, 82. He notes: "this is not merely a loose employment of the normal use of
the word. ... The fact that this use is a subtle and thought-out transference of
the term to the great central problem of multeity in unity, gives an emotiona
significance of the highest order to this otherwise cold technical term."
221 have argued this point more fully, and have provided a hermetical founda
tion for it - a foundation derived from Coleridge's views on reading, language,

and understanding - in "Coleridge, the Reader: Language in a Combustible

Mind." This article will appear in a forthcoming issue of Philological Quarterly
(Winter 1980).

23 "Literary History, Allegory, and Semiology," New Literary History, 7
(Winter, 1976), 263-64.
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Culler, I believe, overstates this last point,
tions for the production of meaning is less a
than it is, first of all, a product of his contem
and an organismic trope. That is, Coleridge's
is, above all else, connected with scientific

of his day, especially with the new organic

describes in terms of scientific research of t

of knowledge, such as history, were undergo
mology, but science was clearly providing the
formal operations in language do not chang

but alter because of changes in the operat
which, in turn, affect the formal operations

it. Such is the case here, and Culler, perhaps
when he depends on the biological term "org
tic shift in other discourses such as history.
Coleridge's 1816 distinction between allegor
most famous critical definitions and tools, in

many of his literary maxims at this time deri

tific discourse. I have already shown how in

tific language is transferred directly to a liter

cal principles which have made Coleridge f
In those examples, the scientific language p

explicitly meant to organize the attribution
that reading a poem as either allegorical or sy

cussions regarding how and what the poem
the scientific discourse controls much of t

graphia Literaria; and, though scientific lang
on Coleridge's descriptions and judgments o
as often these critical interpretations are m
code or model which supplements the primar

meaning one would be hard pressed to loca
The features of the text which this scientific

are naturally predetermined by the code itse
which has been arguing the priority of fun
medical audience will accordingly be directed
poem.

So much has been written about Coleridge's formal criticism and his
organic model that it is not necessary to rehash points that have become
commonplaces. What is worth attention, though, are the elaborations on
that trope which follow from Coleridge's more subtle thinking about science in 1815, and the way these elaborations manifest themselves in the

practical criticism of Biographia Literaria. For instance, Coleridge's
ground for differentiating poetry and prose, the first truly practical prob-

lem in the Biographia, immediately recalls the first issue of the medical
controversy over mechanical structure vs. organic function:
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A poem contains the same elements as a prose composition; the difference
therefore must consist in a different combination of them, in consequence of a
different object being proposed. According to the difference of the object will

be the difference of the combination. It is possible, that the object may b
merely to facilitate the recollection of any given facts or observations by arti-

ficial arrangement; and the composition will be a poem, merely because it is
distinguished from prose by meter, or by rhyme, or by both conjointly. (BL
II, 8)
In short, what differentiates poetry and prose is not mere arrangement of

"elements," as the mechanistic scientists would argue, but the function

of the two forms, the "object being proposed" by each.
The emphasis on function over arrangement informs the vast majority
of critical judgments in Biographia Literaria; and, as Coleridge attempt
to employ this formula in different and more subtle ways when analyzing
poems, scientific tropes and biological descriptions more overtly prejudice

the judgments. In fact, biological descriptions and connotations are so
ubiquitous that the scientific world of plants and organisms merges with
the literary world. Differentiating Wordsworth's and Coleridge's natural

world, Abrams notes that the "nature" Coleridge "ultimately appeals to
in art is basically a biological nature," and it "is astonishing how much
of Coleridge's critical writing is couched in terms that are metaphorica
for art and literal for plants. . . . Only let the vehicle of his metaphor
come alive, and you see all the objects of criticism writhe surrealistically

into plants or parts of plants, growing in tropical profusion."24 Indeed
Coleridge's prefatory statement on Wordsworth's "Descriptive Sketches"

is a description of an organic jungle:

seldom, if ever, was the emergence of an original genius above the literary hori-

zon more evidently announced. In the form, style, and manner of the whol

poem, and in the structure of particular lines and periods, there is an harshness
and acerbity connected and combined with words and images all a-glow, which

might recall those products of the vegetable world, where gorgeous blossoms
rise out of the hard and thorny rind and shell, within which the rich fruit was
elaborating. The language was not only peculiar and strong, but at times knotty

and contorted, as by its own impatient strength. (BL I, 56; my emphasis)

Later, he lists as the third and fourth excellences of Wordsworth's poetry

"the sinewy strength and originality of single lines and paragraphs ....
the perfect truth of nature in his images and descriptions, as taken immediately from nature, and proving a long and genial intimacy with the very

spirit which gives the physiognomic expression to all works of nature
(BL II, 121). And finally, "as a sort of allegory, or connected simile and
metaphor of Wordsworth's intellect and genius," Coleridge quotes Bartram's Travels: "'The soil is a deep, rich, dark mould, on a deep stratum
24 The Mirror and the Lamp (London, 1953), 121.
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of tenacious clay; and that on a foundation
through both strata, lifting their back abov
chiefly grow here are the gigantic black oak
nus excelsior; platane; and a few stately t
Three years after these statements Colerid
"comparative anatomist" who "works from
similation" and produces beautiful fruits, u
who "took from the ear and eye, unchecked
possibility, just as a man might fit togeth
quarter of an apple, and the like of a lemo

make it look like one round diverse colored fr

Although Abrams hesitates to admit it a

pedals by asking pardon for the terms borro

any, Coleridge clearly intended Wordswor
literally to come alive and be seen as a livi
can never actually have a "physiognomic e
Coleridge's critical language can attribute
peare's poetry by using a biological langua

biological referent. Abrams himself suggests

in The Mirror and the Lamp he explains

analogies are often not simply illustrative but

the case here where Coleridge's scientific c
living organism, a three-dimensional object,
same way as his plants and animals and men

Pater, I believe, is more correct than most
plains of Coleridge's identifying the poem

graphia Literaria Coleridge certainly exagger
ridge may be, as critics have traditionally

creative process, the subjective nature of p
that process is objectified, presented as a p

language which transforms the forces of the

uct. The language is much more elusive in
quite clear that the forces operative in a poe

three forces of nature: magnetism, electricit

is, in other words, a six-part homology estab

biology and the world of poetry. The great va

part model from science to poetry is that

distinguish different operations in a poem w

unity on the evidence that, as in the biolo
Life," "the lower powers are assimilated, n
presupposes homogeneity" (TL, 386).

25 Coleridge's Miscellaneous Criticism, ed. T.
1936), 95, 42-3.
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Of the three powers which Coleridge describes in "Theory of Life,"
magnetism or polarity is the one he most frequently discusses. In "Theory
of Life" he makes it clear that, as the most basic force in nature, magnetism is the first expression of the polarity principle; and in this state it is

predominantly mechanical, "two equal forces acting in opposite directions" (BL I, 197). Barfield, without doubt the most lucid explicator of

polarity, makes the crucial point that the mechanical law of polarity must
be distinguished from the power of polarity; for if magnetism is an essen-

tially mechanical law, it eventually becomes assimilated into a higher

power which is essentially dynamic. In their most primitive form, before

their conversion into a vital power, the poles of a magnet provide an

object with fixity: the magnetic poles are "the primary constituent Powers."26 As Seth Watson observes in his introduction to "Theory of Life,"
magnetism thus becomes the "first and simplest differential act of Natur
... the first step from indifference to difference, from formless homoge-

neity to independent existence" (TL, 360).
In a poem this rudimentary act of fixity and differentiation is described by the famous pairs which comprise all poems and which become
objectified elements in the poem-"sameness with difference; of the general, with the concrete; the idea, with the image; the individual, with the
representative; the sense of novelty and freshness, with old and familiar
objects; a more than usual state of emotion, with more than usual order"

(BL II, 12). These differentiate a poem, define it, and balance it, as i

were, in a fixed position. Balance, in fact, is the key to the polar arrangement in a poem, just as it is in a magnet, for "in all pure phaenomena we

behold only the copula, the balance or indifference of opposite ener
gies."27 Accordingly, where Wordsworth's feelings are "disproportionate

to such knowledge and value of objects described" the stability of the
poem is upset; and accusing Wordsworth of mental bombast is a criticism

of misbalanced energies (BL II, 109). Likewise, Coleridge complains of

metaphysical poets and some of his contemporaries who in different ways
destroy the balance needed in a poem. "Our faulty elder poets sacrificed
the passion and passionate flow of poetry to the subtleties of intellect, and
to the starts of wit; the moderns to the glare and glitter of a perpetual,

yet broken and heterogeneous imagery, or rather to an amphibious some-

thing, made up, half of image, and half of abstract meaning. The one
sacrificed the heart to the head; the other both heart and head to poin
and drapery" (BL I, 15).
Because Coleridge himself rarely dissected his polarity principle and

only in "Theory of Life" and in his long letter to Tulk in 1817 made a sus
tained attempt to show clearly how it relates to the magnetic law as op26 Cited in Owen Barfield, What Coleridge Thought (Middleton, Conn., 1971),
32.

27 Collected Letters, IV, 760.
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posed to the electrical power, critics often co

ism and the polarity of electricity. But in or
intricacies of the criticism in Biographia Lit

of imagination, one must be aware of the

polarity is the first law of nature, and magn

and repulsion is the first manifestation of t

magnetism generate a second force, electricit
izes the fixed magnetic field and stands as th

(Magnetism and electricity become interse

two poles.) In Coleridge's evolutionary schem
fests itself most obviously in inorganic meta

trical force becomes predominant, vegetab

from the conjunction of electricity and magn
the different forms of life are made. In the

the magnetic poles, "life subsists"; in their s

ity, "it [life] consists" (TL, 393).
The addition of this life-producing pow
scheme should never be underestimated. Seth Watson went so far as to

say that electricity was "the foundation of life" for Coleridge. This is of

course an exaggeration, a point Coleridge made abundantly clear in

"Theory of Life" where electricity functions only as a primary manifesta
tion of one power in life. Yet, electricity did provide an illustration and
scientific solution to a scientific scheme that associates magnetism with

lifeless arrangement. A "new light was struck by the discovery of electric-

ity, and in every sense of the word, . . . it may be affirmed to have elec
trified the whole frame of natural philosophy" (TL, 375). Electricity was
a power that could convert the static arrangement of the magnetic field
into a space of vital action and movement.28 Magnetism represented the

law of polarity, electricity the vitalization or operation of that law. I
magnetism demonstrated the law of polarity in inorganic matter, elec
tricity could assimilate magnetism to reveal the one power which brings
polarity to life in organic matter. The principle of fixity thus fuses with
the principle of dynamic motion; or, as he phrases it in a description of
artistic beauty, "confining form" unites with the "electrical flashes" o
"free life" ("Genial Criticism," 235).
In Biographia Literaria the imagination is an objectified power within
the poem and, as such, it is the counterpart to the electrical power i
nature described in "Theory of Life." The scientific language with which
it is described is indicative of this correspondence: "The primary imagination I hold to be the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception. . . . The secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the
former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with th
primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in
28 See The Friend, I, 478-79.
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the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, and dissipates, in order to

recreate.... It is essentially vital, even as objects (as objects) are essen
tially fixed and dead" (BL I, 202; my emphasis). "This power, first put

in action by the will and understanding, and retained under their irremis
sive, though gentle and unnoticed control ... reveals itself in the balance

or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities" (BL II, 12). Here
the language is that of a scientific experiment in which an electrical force,

the imagination, galvanizes different elements that are brought under its
power: working together, the will and understanding act as a conducto

that organizes a field of "opposite and discordant qualities" which the
fusing power of the imagination vitalizes in a manner strikingly similar

to the operation of the electrical force found in nature. Shakespeare's

work is thus a "growth, evolution" whereby "each line, each word almost,
begets the following-and the will of the writer is an interfusion, a continuous agency, no series of separate acts."29 The conducting will unite
with the fusing imagination to become "an interfusion, a continuous agen
cy" of power and control that at once organizes and activates the multiple
elements of a wide and varied experience.
The clearest use of electricity in practical criticism is found in Coleridge's analysis of meter. He begins by describing the origins of meter,
tracing it "to the balance of the mind effected by the spontaneous effort
which strives to hold in check the workings of passion. It might be easily
explained likewise in what manner this salutary antagonism is assisted by
the very state, which it counteracts; and how this balance of antagonists

becomes organized into meter . . . by a supervening act of the will and
judgment" (BL II, 50). Meter, that is, is generated out of a polarity of

passion and the controlling effort of the mind which, like the magnetic
field, together form a balance of antagonists between which the will intervenes like a conductor. Metrical restraint is then balanced with a language
of passion ("as every passion has its proper pulse, so it will likewise have

its characteristic mode of expression" (BL II, 56). In short, mental re-

straint and passion balance in an original act of the mind that results in
meter; to create poetry, this metrical framework is in turn bound and

balanced with a special, emotional language: "meter therefore having

been connected with poetry most often and by a peculiar fitness, whatever

else is combined with meter must, though it not be essentially poetic, have

nevertheless some property in common with poetry, as an intermedium
of affinity, a sort (if I may dare borrow a well-known phrase from technical chemistry) of mordaunt between it and the super-added meter" (BL

II, 55). The suggestion here-which could be made only through the
scientific language in which it is couched-is that meter can be either an
artificial or natural part of a poem in that "an intermedium of affinity"

should naturally bind meter to the language of a poem. And although
29 Miscellaneous Criticism, 88-9.
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Coleridge never explicitly explains it in terms

clear that what activates this affinity is the im

describes, with similar scientific language,
and unites contrary elements. Where Colerid
ance and conjunction between the language of
in Wordsworth's "Anecdote for Fathers," "

"The Beggars," and "The Sailor's Mother,"
these poems "would have been delightful...

as by Mr. Wordsworth they would have been

trian tour" (BL II, 53). About "The Sailor

quotes three stanzas and queries "whether in
sufficient reason for their being written me
referring here, I believe, to the model he has
must be a vitalized affinity between the m
poem. As the two are joined but not imaginat
worth poem, the meter sits oddly on the lan
leaves of one flower would look strange if unn
of another species.

In "Theory of Life" Coleridge discusses m

also in terms of "progressive individuation" a

evaluations and judgments in Biographia L
ceasing polarity of life" represented by ma

"the form of its progress, and its tendency t

is "the law of its direction" (TL, 407). Here
the form, and what I have associated with

the electrical force (in nature), namely the p

becomes "the tendency to progressive indiv

viduation embraces two counteracting tenden
tachment from the universal life . . . and that of attachment or reduction

into it" (TL, 389), both of which reappear in the Biographia and the
related essays in the phrase "multeity in unity," whose definition almost

always approximates the definition of progressive individuation. Commenting on the pleasure of art, Coleridge says it "consists in the identity

of two opposite elements, that is to say-sameness and variety. ... In
order to derive pleasure from the occupation of the mind, the principle
of unity must always be present, so that in the midst of the multeity the

centripetal force be never suspended, nor the sense be fatigued by the
predominance of the centrifugal force. This unity in multeity I have else-

where stated as the principle of beauty" (BL II, 262). And, early in
Biographia Literaria, Coleridge lays the groundwork for differentiating
kinds of creative minds by distinguishing the centrifugal and centripetal
forces in the mind: "The intelligence in the one tends to objectize itself,
and in the other to know itself in the object" (BL I, 188).
Whether Coleridge is talking about the creative process of art or the
forces of nature, the significance of the language remains the same in
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each of these passages. As the progressive individuation manifested in the

electrical force unites and vitalizes two opposite movements in the life
process, in poetry the imagination performs the same task; and, though

Coleridge never bluntly states this, he values a work of art most when
its centrifugal-centripetal make-up resembles man, the organism in whom
the two forces reach their maximum strength and scope, in whom there
is the "highest realization and reconciliation of both . . . tendencies, that
of most perfect detachment and the greatest possible union" (TL, 422).
Accordingly, if the paramount, most admirable organism is the one
that manifests the most detachment with the greatest attachment, in literature most value will be awarded to the work that manifests the greatest
individuality with the greatest universality.3" The works of Shakespeare

and Milton are Coleridge's examples here. Shakespeare's plays not only
have a universal scope and variety but they also contain a proportionate
degree of judgment and unity; "in Shakespeare the play is syngensia [a
flower species]-each indeed has a life of its own and is an individuum
of itself, but yet an organ to the whole.""3 Conversely, while always retaining the stamp of the individual man, the poems of Milton contain the
greatest of eternal truths. Wordsworth too is praised as "individualized";
but his characters, unlike Shakespeare's, are faulted as overly peculiar and
"incongruous," "for amid the strongest individuation, the character must
still remain representative" (BL II, 106-7). Finally, the great philosophical poem that Coleridge expected from Wordsworth would doubtless have

been great because, like man, the scope of its vision would have been
matched by the strength of its individuality.

I have discussed progressive individuation in its relation to the second
power in Coleridge's biological scheme, electricity in nature and the imag-

ination in poetry, since Coleridge most usually associates it with these
two phenomena. Yet, as all three powers are bound together in a single
organism, so the tendency to individuate cannot be separated from the
third power, chemical affinity, which corresponds to the intellectual en-

ergy and reason behind a poem. As Coleridge demonstrates throughout
"Theory of Life," chemical affinity adds the dimension of depth to an
organism when it unites with length and breadth, magnetism and electricity, and Coleridge equates this chemical affinity with sensibility. He
describes this third dimension best in a manuscript note:
all that is outside is comprized in length and surface-what remains must therefore be inside-but again, the sole definition of matter is that which fills space

-now it is with length, breadth, and length relative to breadth that space is
filled. In other words, Space has relation only to the outside. Depth must therefore be that by not with which space is filled . . . it must be that which causes

it to be filled, and is therefore the true substance. Depth therefore cannot be
0 I. A. Richards, another scientific critic, inherited this notion from Coleridge.
31 Miscellaneous Criticism, 95.
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an attribute of matter, which (i.e. Length+B

mere abstraction, an ens rationis; but it must be

is inwardness, outwardness being its effect and m

Illustrating inwardness, "the true substan

a perilous task for a critic; but nonetheless C

what coyly, by locating a particular kind
praises the "atmosphere and depth and hei

world; and he characterizes the fifth of Wor

tative pathos, as "a union of deep and sub
(BL II, 122). For Coleridge this is an impo

of Wordsworth, and it correlates neatly wit
organism-depth, sensibility, and inwardne
protean presence but one which most reader

in a poem, "thought" is perhaps as specifi

third dimensional property in a poem. But h
poem is extremely difficult, and this difficu

paratively little Coleridge says about dep
the poem it dwells in the realm of Colerid

"Ideas," clearly distinguished from the imag
imagination, Shakespeare possesses another p
the former could scarce exist in a high degr
ergy of Thought." In an 1818 lecture, Colerid
of these two powers, imaginative force and
"worked in the spirit of nature, by evolving
tive power according to an idea." For, "No m

without being at the same time a profoun
peare's poems the creative power and the i
in a war embrace" (BL II, 19). The thinke
artist, adds a dimension to the poem, so th

energy of thought unite in a poem, like elect
cal affinity in the life process, to create an

and mysterious as the highest organism in n
This ultimately mysterious nature of art a

gets, no matter how analytical he becomes, a
model should never be confused with poeti
constituent forces of life are the power of l
of surface (electricity), and the power of de
itself is neither of these separately, but the
Indeed the powers of life may manifest them
sible forms, yet "visible surface and power o
power of life, are ideas which the forms of

it impossible to identify" (TL, 378). Likewise
32 Cited in Barfield, 202.
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exists beyond the components Coleridge chooses to isolate for criticism,
and a critic's most egregious mistake would be to imagine Wordsworth's
or any author's poetry simple and containable.
What Coleridge and other literary critics can do is to understand and
explain life and poetry with language. Precisely because of its linguis

nature, this act of understanding will always be an act of commitme
and choice-a choice of how he will understand and, subsequently, wh
he will understand. Scientific language does not accidentally or inadve

tently appear in Biographia Literaria; it is the controlling discourse that

Coleridge chooses for good reasons and with full knowledge of its im
plications. He recognizes the power of connotations; he recognizes th

way different tropes and metaphors could not only organize but produc
meanings. He writes about a "fusing power" in a poem entirely conscious
of its commensurability with the "fusing power" of electricity. And, de

scribing "depth" in a poem or its centripetal-centrifugal balance, Col
ridge consciously creates a meaning, a biological meaning, rather th
extracting that meaning from a poem. In 1815 the language of sci-

ence was gaining an authority that could only diminish the authority of
other languages: due to the purported objectivity of scientific practice a
discourse, scientific statements simply had more validity than poetic or
theological statements. For Coleridge, the way to counter this trend was
to make a poem mean scientifically, to show that scientific truths are n
more confined to science than scientific discourse is the sole property o
the laboratory worker. If poetry should never pretend to be science, poetry should never cower before the language of science. Coleridge's scien
tific poetics and biological tropes are an important attempt to show that
poetry is at least as challenging, mysterious, and intellectually rigoro
as the best of modern science.

Temple University.
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